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Foreign Aided: Why Democratization Brings Growth
When Democracy Does Not
JACOB GERNER HARIRI*
There is an unresolved puzzle in research on the economics of democracy. While there is consensus
that democracy is not generally associated with higher rates of economic growth, recent studies have
found that democratization is followed by growth. But why should becoming a democracy bring
growth if being one does not? This article shows that a substantial and immediate inﬂux of foreign
aid into new democracies accounts for the positive growth effect of democratization. The domestic
regime characteristics of neither democracy nor democratization therefore seems to bring growth. The
importance of aid in explaining the democratization-growth nexus underscores that democratizations
do not occur in vacuum and cannot be fully understood from internal factors alone.
There is scholarly agreement that democracy is not associated with higher rates of economic
growth than other regime forms.1 However a recent body of research has found that
democratization is followed by a period of increased economic growth.2 This constitutes an
unresolved puzzle, for why should becoming a democracy promote economic growth if being
one does not?3 What factors distinguish young democracies from established democracies
and can plausibly spur growth? This is all the more puzzling since many scholars expect
democratic transitions to be associated with economic hardship.4
This article documents that across a wide range of speciﬁcations and controls, a
substantial and immediate inﬂux of aid into young democracies fully accounts for the
positive growth effect of democratization. That is to say, democratization is associated
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Satyanath, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Stefan Voigt, Asger Wingender, as well as the editor and three
anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments on a previous version. Data replication sets and online
appendices are available at http://dx.doi.org/doi: 10.1017/S0007123413000276.
1 See, for example, Dellepiane-Avelleneda 2010; Krieckhaus 2004; Przeworski et al. 2000; Sirowy and
Inkeles 1990.
2 Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008; Persson 2005; Persson and Tabellini
2006; Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005. The democratization-growth nexus has proven robust to a variety of
model speciﬁcations and controls (for example, Persson and Tabellini 2007).
3 Convergence is an obvious reason why democratization might enhance growth even if democracy
does not: democratizing countries are relatively poor, so the effects of democratization could be
confounded by the mechanics of economic catch-up. All democratization studies, however, control
explicitly for the dynamics of convergence.
4 For example, Przeworski et al. (2000, 188) argue that ‘[p]olitical upheavals [including regime
transitions] divert resources and energies away from production and thus affect the contemporaneous
growth of the economy’. Zakaria (2003, 99) points to ‘a passing phase, the growing pains that young
democracies must endure’. Similarly, Dahrendorf (1990, 138–9) argues that ‘[p]olitical transition leads to
economic frustration, resulting in instability and unrest’.
with growth, but this is caused by international redistribution rather than the domestic
characteristics of political regime change in itself. This explanation resolves the puzzle,
because it shows that the regime characteristics of neither young nor established
democracies are, in themselves, growth promoting.
On a broader level, the article provides a complementary perspective on the importance of
interstate linkages in political regime research. The existing literature on cross-country
linkages and regime diffusion has focused on explaining if and when democratic transitions
occur.5 The results in this article are complementary because they illustrate the importance
of interstate linkages in understanding the causes and the consequences of democratization.
Countries do not democratize in a vacuum, and whether democratization is the explanan-
dum or (as here) the explanans, democratizations cannot be fully understood from internal
factors alone.
On a methodological level, the results that follow illustrate why we should be cautious
in treating reduced-form associations between political institutions and economic
outcomes as causal, when it is often not speciﬁed how the political arrangement in
question should affect the economy. Helpman and Dellepiane-Avellaneda also raised this
point; they agree that one of the major shortcomings in the empirical institutionalist
literature is that it ‘still lacks a proper grasp of the channels through which institutions
affect growth’.6 This article supplies one such channel for the case of institutional reform
as democratization: aid. And since aid is not a characteristic of the political regime,
identifying a link between democratization and growth substantively changes the
conclusions that follow from reduced-form analyses. This illustrates why reduced-form
associations should be treated with caution in empirical institutionalist research.
Lastly, the conclusions are of interest to the development community since they highlight
an interesting circularity: much aid is conditioned on institutional reform based on the explicit
presumption that the reform in question will help a country realize its growth potential.
In the case of democratic reform, the results suggest that it is not the growth-promoting
institutional reform in itself that brings growth, but rather the aid that comes with it.
To make these points, the article ﬁrst re-establishes the positive association between
democratization and growth using the difference-in-difference (DID)/ﬁxed-effects speciﬁca-
tions from the recent literature and shows that this positive association is driven by the early
years of the democratic transition. These results are robust to a set of different speciﬁcations
and, importantly, to a set of plausible mediating variables that has been considered in the
literature. I then document a tight co-movement between aid and growth in the years
following democratization. Aid, like growth, is signiﬁcantly associated with democratization;
and the inﬂow of aid, like the alleged growth effect, stops after about ten years. Finally, I
show that across speciﬁcations and controls, the inﬂux of aid to young democracies fully
accounts for the positive association between democratization and growth.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature
and takes a preliminary look at some of the channels that have been proposed to mediate the
effect of democratization on growth. After describing the data and estimation approach, the
main empirical results follow for the period 1960–2010. The penultimate section provides
historical evidence from the period 1820–1959 along with robustness checks that use
alternative measures of democracy and foreign aid. The ﬁnal section concludes.
5 See, for example, Elkink 2011; Gleditsch and Cederman, 2004; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Starr 1991.
6 Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2010, 196. See also Helpman 2004, 141.
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TWO BODIES OF REGIME RESEARCH AND A PUZZLE
There is scholarly agreement that democracy is not, in general, associated with higher rates
of economic growth. For example, in their summary of the democracy-growth literature,
Przeworski and Limongi found the evidence to be inconclusive: an equal number of studies
reported in favor of democratic regimes and autocratic regimes, and a few found no
signiﬁcant differences across regime types.7 In a similar survey, Sirowy and Inkeles found
‘a very mixed and confusing picture with regard to the effect of democracy on economic
growth’.8 A decade later, Przeworski et al. concluded that ‘the entire controversy seems to
have been much ado about nothing’ and, recently, Dellepiane-Avellaneda found that
‘political regimes were not a key source of variation in observed growth rates’.9
In contrast to this early body of work, more recent studies have consistently found that
becoming a democracy is positively associated with increased rates of economic growth.10
The ﬁve studies mentioned in the note use broadly similar speciﬁcations, and all conﬁrm
the positive association. Of particular interest here are the results from Rodrik and
Wacziarg. These authors unpack the temporal dynamics of the democratization-growth
nexus and demonstrate that the overall positive growth effect is driven by the early years
of the regime transition. Not only is democratization growth promoting (while democracy
is not), the overall effect of democratization is driven by the early years of becoming
a democracy.
Methodologically, the democratization-growth literature rests on less stark assump-
tions for causal inference than the democracy-growth studies.11 While this is sometimes
presented as a methodological argument in favor of the recent literature,12 one
should bear in mind that, methodology aside, the research question is different: one
literature inquires into the economics of regime form, the other into the economics of
regime change.
If the conclusions from both literatures stand to reason, we are left with the puzzling
result that economic growth accelerates while countries become democracies, and slows
down when they are democracies. This naturally begs the question of what factor – that is
plausibly associated with an immediate and short-lived growth effect – might distinguish
7 Przeworski and Limongi 1993.
8 Sirowy and Inkeles 1990, 137.
9 Dellepiane-Avellaneda 2012, 198; Przeworski et al. 2000, 178. In a careful analysis of the cross-
sectional literature, Krieckhaus (2004) found that the association between democracy and growth was
sensitive to the choice of control variables as well as to the time period under consideration. Krieckhaus
concluded that ‘in the end, this article cannot resolve the question of whether democracy in fact inﬂuences
economic growth’ (2004, 653). See also Krieckhaus 2006.
10 Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008; Persson 2005; Persson and Tabellini
2006; and Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005.
11 The estimated growth effect of democratization is in principle computed by subtracting the average
annual growth change in countries that do not democratize from the average annual growth change in
democratizing countries. This double difference (difference-in-difference) removes bias in comparisons
between democratizers and non-democratizers that result from permanent differences between the two
groups, as well as biases from comparisons over time in the group of democratizing countries that would
result from time trends unrelated to democratization. The identifying assumption requires that
democratizing countries, absent democratization, would on average have experienced the same growth
rates as non-democratizing countries. For comparison, identiﬁcation in the democracy-growth literature
requires that there are no unobserved differences between democracies and non-democracies related to
growth (one such difference could be, for example, culture).
12 For example, Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005, 1302.
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democratizing countries from democracies? To provide a preliminary answer to this
question, consider the channels proposed in the democratization-growth literature.
Papaioannou and Siourounis examine whether ‘the signiﬁcant effect of democratization
[y] operates through capital accumulation or sound government or trade policies’ and
ﬁnd a strong effect of democratization that is conditional on these channels.13 Giavazzi
and Tabellini ﬁnd ‘some acceleration of growth (but not investment) at the time of
democratization’, and leave the channel unidentiﬁed.14 Persson and Tabellini15 also
consider induced policy changes, focusing on government spending and subsequent
economic liberalization. Conditional on economic liberalization, their estimate of the
growth effect of democratization increases slightly. This ﬁnding suggests, again, that the
association between democratization and growth does not run through subsequent
economic liberalization.
Figure 1 shows the paths of the potential channels of inﬂuence (capital accumulation,
government spending, trade ﬂows, foreign direct investment and aid) for ﬁfteen years
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Fig. 1. Years around democratization
Note: The ﬁgure shows the coefﬁcients on dummies for each of the years surrounding democratization.
The analyses include country and year ﬁxed effects. The dashed lines indicate the 95 per cent conﬁdence
interval. Sources: Marshall and Jaggers 2011, World Bank 2012.
13 Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008, 1533.
14 Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005, 1319. The authors also ﬁnd mixed effects on macroeconomic policies
(lower government surplus, but higher inﬂation) as well as positive indications on the perception of good
governance.
15 Persson and Tabellini (2006).
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on either side of the onset of democratization.16 This graphic illustrates whether, for
example, investment or trade increases immediately after democratization, as one would
expect if these factors were indeed the channels that link democratization and growth.
In the top left panel, there is some sign that investment rates pick up around the time of
democratization, but the increase is never signiﬁcantly different from zero (as can be seen
from the lower dashed curve). In the top middle panel, trade ﬂows also seem to increase, but
the standard errors are far too large for them to be considered statistically signiﬁcant. In the
top right panel, there is some indication that government spending immediately spikes and
gradually falls after democratization, but again the estimates are far from signiﬁcant. Except
for a random, but insigniﬁcant, spike in the fourteenth year preceeding democratization,
foreign direct investment (bottom left panel) shows little variation around the time of
democratization. The ﬁrst four panels in Figure 1, like the recent literature, thus leave
unidentiﬁed the factors that mediate the association between democratization and growth.
Yet arguably, there is nothing about reasonably free elections in themselves that affects
national income. So if the euphoria of political emancipation is not in itself sufﬁcient to
raise productivity and national income, we should be able to uncover the channels of
inﬂuence. The bottom middle panel shows that aid inﬂows visibly spike immediately upon
democratization. The average democratizing country receives an immediate injection
of aid of about 6 per cent of gross national income (GNI) in the ﬁrst ﬁve years after
democratization, and aid levels remain signiﬁcantly elevated for about a decade. In contrast
to the other candidate variables, the association between aid and democratization is
signiﬁcant during most of the post-democratization period – particularly in the immediate
post-transition years, which Rodrik and Wacziarg found to be driving the positive
association between democratization and growth. Even if preliminary and univariate, the
evidence in Figure 1 suggests that analyses of the democratization-growth nexus should
take the inﬂux of aid into account. Before doing so, I brieﬂy describe the operationalization
of democratization, the data and the estimation approach used.
DATA, OPERATIONALIZATION AND ESTIMATION APPROACH
In keeping with the recent democratization-growth literature, the analyses that follow use the
Polity IV measure of democracy (the 21-point scaled variable polity2). While this measure of
democracy is standard in the empirical literature, it has been the subject of some debate.17
16 The variables are the following series from the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2012):
gross ﬁxed capital formation (per cent of gross domestic product, GDP), trade (per cent of GDP), general
government ﬁnal consumption expenditure (per cent of GDP), foreign direct investment, net inﬂows (per
cent of GDP) and ofﬁcial development assistance (per cent of GNI).
17 Since Robert Dahl’s seminal 1971 contribution, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, the
literature on measuring democracy has come close to a consensus that, as proposed by Dahl, the
constitutive attributes of democracy are participation and contestation. Contestation is the right of at
least some of the population to ‘contest the conduct of the government’, and participation is the
proportion of the population that is entitled to do so (Dahl 1971, 1–8). For example, Huntington 1991, 7;
Lijphart 1999, 48–9; Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 9; and Vanhanen 2000, 253 all explicitly build upon
Dahl’s two-dimensional conceptualization of democracy. The conceptualization of democracy in
Polity IV has been criticized for ignoring the second dimension, participation. In the words of Munck
and Verkuilen (2002, 11), however, conditional on contestation, ‘universal suffrage can be taken for
granted in the post-1945 period’. See also Przeworski et al. (2000, 34) for a similar argument. The core
analyses examine the post-1945 period, but are not completely insulated from this critique, given that
some of the robustness checks extend as far back as 1820. There, the omission of the participation
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The core ﬁndings are therefore reproduced using the so-called ACLP indicator, which
was originally constructed by Przeworski et al. and recently updated by Cheibub, Gandhi
and Vreeland.18
Polity IV offers a tripartite distinction between autocracy (polity score below 1),
partial democracy (polity score 1–6) and full democracy (polity score 7–10).19 Follow-
ing this classiﬁcation, I refer to democratization as the event of becoming a (partial
or full) democracy if a country was an autocracy in the previous year. This is the
operationalization used in the democratization-growth literature.20 To keep the results
comparable, it is crucial to use the same. This yields a total of sixty-nine democratizations
in the period under consideration (1960–2010).21 A full list is available in the online
appendix.
With this basic operationalization, I ﬁrst deﬁned a single democratization dummy
that takes the value 1 in the year a country passes the threshold, and stays at 1 for all years
in which the country remains a partial or full democracy. This operationalization follows,
for example, the work of Persson and Tabellini and Giavazzi and Tabellini.22 Secondly,
I carved the event of democratization into three consequtive phases, each of which
is represented by a dummy variable. Phases 1 and 2 last ﬁve years each, while Phase 3
measures subsequent years (if the country does not revert back to autocracy). This
approach is similar to that of Rodrik and Wacziarg.23
With these variables, I estimate a ﬁxed-effects DID model. The baseline estimating
equation is:
gi;t5 ai1fDi;t1 byi;t11 gXi;t1 mt1 i;t; ð1Þ
where gi,t is annual growth in per capita GDP in country i in year t. Di,t is the binary
democratization indicator, which captures all years after a country’s polity score becomes
strictly positive. The coefﬁcient of primary interest is f, which measures the correlation
between economic growth and democratization. As described above, to examine the
temporal dynamics, the event of democratization was carved into three consecutive
phases, each of which is represented by a dummy variable. When estimating this model,
(F’note continued)
dimension is potentially problematic. Still, the Polity IV measure is used to retain consistency with the
research on democratization and growth, to which this study is most directly related.
18 Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2009); Przeworski et al. (2000).
19 Marshall and Jaggers 2011, 35.
20 For example, Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005, 300; Persson and Tabellini 2006, 319.
21 Following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005, 1304) and Persson and Tabellini (2006, note 1), the
following speciﬁc coding rules were used. (1) A minimum of ﬁve years of data after the start of
democratization is required to include a country as an instance of democratization. This rules out Gabon,
which democratized in 2009 according to the operationalization used here. (2) At least one year of data is
required before the country democratizes to include it as an instance of democratization. This rules out
Ukraine and others that are coded as democratic throughout and belong to the control group. (3) At least
ﬁve uninterrupted years of democratization are required before they are counted as such. Shorter
democratic reversals (polity2 falling below one for four years or less) are counted as ‘autocratic interim’,
and all speciﬁcations include autocratic and democratic interim dummies. The autocratic dummy variable
takes the value 1 for Thailand in 1991, Albania in 1996 and Peru in 1992, among a few others.
22 Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; Persson and Tabellini 2006.
23 Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005. When estimating this model, following Rodrik and Wacziarg, controls
for autocratization (deﬁned as the mirror image of democratization, and lasting up to ten years) and state
failure as coded by Polity IV are included.
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the democratization indicator, Di,t in Equation 1 is simply replaced by the three dummies
(Phase 1i,t, Phase 2i,t and Phase 3i,t as deﬁned earlier). Lagged per capita income, yi,t21, is
included to allow for economic convergence. Xi,t is a vector of control variables. In all
speciﬁcations, the control vector includes a dummy for the ﬁve years that precede
democratization in order to account for the possibility that democratization occurs in
response to changed economic performance. It also detects systematic ‘pre-treatment’
differences between democratizing and non-democratizing countries (all conclusions also
hold without controlling for pre-democratization years). Regional dummies interacted
with time for Africa, Latin America, post-communist countries and oil-producing
countries are also included as controls.24 All models are run twice: ﬁrst in reduced form
(the potential channels – capital accumulation, government spending, trade and economic
liberalization – are not controlled for) and secondly, including these channels as part of
Xi,t. The three remaining terms are unobserved effects. Country-speciﬁc, time-invariant
characteristics, ai, are controlled for using the ﬁxed-effects speciﬁcation. The time-varying
unobserved effects, mt, are controlled for by including a full set of year dummies for
1961–2010. ei,t is the idiosyncratic error term (unobserved effects that vary across
countries and over time).
In some speciﬁcations, Equation 1 is estimated as an autoregressive distributed lag
(ADL) model, including two lags of the dependent variable (gi,t21 and gi,t22) in
addition to the lagged income per capita. This was done to address the issue of serial
correlation, which attenuates standard errors and can be particularly problematic for the
DID estimator.25 The ADL speciﬁcations also include a two-year lag as well as a
contemporaneous and lagged difference of all economic controls.26 This speciﬁcation
follows Papaioannou and Siourounis.27 In all models, standard errors are robustly
clustered at the country level in order to minimize arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation.28
The core analyses employ a panel data set of 124 countries in the period 1960–2010,
with a total of 4,402 observations. Economic data for the period 1960–2010 are from
the World Bank, while the historical growth data (1820–1959) used for robustness
checks are from Maddison.29 The main speciﬁcations code democratizations from the
Polity IV data set are as explained above, but robustness checks were conducted using
the dichotomous ACLP indicator. Following the voluminous aid-growth literature, the
main measure of aid is net ofﬁcial development assistance (ODA) normalized by income
(net ODA as per cent of GNI).30 Robustness checks were conducted using David
24 It is well known that democratizations tend to cluster geographically and temporally (for example,
Latin America in the 1980s and post-communist countries in the 1990s). If such clustering coincides with
growth trends that are unrelated to democratic reform, this would bias the estimates. All conclusions are
upheld if post-communist countries are removed altogether, and without regional dummies. Also included
also is a ‘US friend’ dummy, which is standard in the aid-growth literature. It is assigned a value of 1 for
Egypt and Israel and 0 otherwise.
25 Bertrand et al. 2004.
26 More speciﬁcally, Equation 1 was also estimated as: gi;t5ai1fDemoci;t1 byi;t11 pgi;t11FðLÞXi;t1
CðLÞDXi;t11mt1 i;t.
27 Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008.
28 In all models, classical and robust standard errors are identical to at least the fourth decimal. This is
reassuring, given the warning in King and Roberts (2012) that a difference can be a sign of model
misspeciﬁcation.
29 World Bank 2012; Maddison 2010.
30 For example Dalgaard, Hansen, and Tarp 2004
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Roodman’s Net Aid Transfers (NAT) dataset.31 The NAT measure differs from the
ODA in that it excludes cancellations of foreign debt as an aid transfer and nets out
loan interest payments. These analyses use the dollar amount of aid (speciﬁcally, the
natural log thereof to reduce the weight of outliers) to address the concern that regressing
growth on aid normalized by income creates problems of reverse causality.32 It is
reassuring, therefore, that the results are very similar whether aid is normalized or
not. The sample is restricted to country-years for which aid data are available even when
aid is not included in the analyses, so that the sample stays constant before and after
controlling for aid.
RESULTS: DEMOCRATIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Estimates of Equation 1 are reported in Table 1. Column 1 shows the coefﬁcient from the
simple DID workhorse model that is commonly used in the literature. Column 2 estimates
the ADL version of Equation 1 as described above, and Column 3 replaces the single
democratization indicator by the three phase dummies. Columns 4–6 are identical to the
TABLE 1 Democratization and Economic Growth
Reduced-form associations Controlling for channels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democratization 0.80* 0.71** 0.82** 0.82**
(0.43) (0.34) (0.39) (0.37)
Democratization Phase 1 0.63 1.28***
(0.55) (0.50)
Democratization Phase 2 1.04** 0.98**
(0.48) (0.43)
Democratization Phase 3 0.18 20.25
(0.51) (0.50)
Pre-Democratization 0.23 0.20 0.32 0.49 0.43 0.52
(0.61) (0.48) (0.61) (0.42) (0.36) (0.42)
Other regime change No No Yes No No Yes
Liberalization No No No Yes Yes Yes
Economic controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,402 4,185 4,384 3,508 3,275 3,508
Countries 124 123 123 118 115 118
R2 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.20 0.21 0.20
Note: The dependent variable is GDP per capita growth. All models contain country and year
ﬁxed effects, lagged income per capita, indicators for short regime interims and time-interacted
regional dummies for Africa, post-communist countries, Latin America and oil-exporting
countries. Column 2 includes two lags of the dependent variable. Column 3 controls for
autocratization and state failure. Columns 4-6 control for investment, trade, government
spending and economic liberalization. Column 5 contains a contemporaneous lag and two lags
of the difference of economic controls. Robust standard errors are clustered by country in
parentheses. ***p, 0.01, **p, 0.05, *p, 0.1. Sources: Marshall and Jaggers (2011), World
Bank (2012), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005).
31 Roodman 2008.
32 See, for example, Wright and Winters 2010.
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ﬁrst three columns, but add controls for the set of proposed mediating variables. Rows
11–13 show which controls are included in the individual models.
The coefﬁcient in Column 1 shows the association between democratization and
growth (and is directly comparable to the coefﬁcient in Persson and Tabellini (2006)
Table 1, Column 1). I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and sizeable annual growth increase of
0.80 per cent, which is substantial.33 For comparison, the Persson and Tabellini study
found 0.75 at a similar level of signiﬁcance. The pre-democratization indicator has an
insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient of 0.23, which suggests that the regime transition does not
occur in response to changed economic performance in the ﬁve years preceeding it. As
mentioned above, the DID estimator rests on the strong assumption that in the
absence of treatment, the average outcomes for treated and controls would have
followed parallel paths. In all models, the pre-democratization dummy is consistently
insigniﬁcant, which shows that before the treatment, treated and controls did in fact
follow parallel paths. Prima facie, this corroborates the identifying assumption of
parallel trends absent treatment. The coefﬁcient on lagged GDP per capita is
signiﬁcantly negative (not shown), documenting a conditional convergence effect. What
matters here is that the estimated growth effect of democratization does not simply
capture convergence.
Column 2 is identical to Column 1, except that it introduces richer time dynamics to
allow for persistence in economic growth rates. The speciﬁcation here includes two lags of
the dependent variable, which makes the speciﬁcation similar to Papaioannou and
Siourounis, Table 2, Column 5. Allowing for growth inertia does not change the
estimated growth effect of democratization, even if the estimate of 0.71 is somewhat
smaller than that found in Papaioannou and Siourounis, who report 1.09 with identical
levels of signiﬁcance.
The model in Column 3 adopts the approach in Rodrik and Wacziarg to uncover the
temporal dynamics of the democratization-growth nexus. Instead of estimating the effect
of democratization en bloc, the event of becoming a democracy has been divided into
three phases. Column 3 documents a hill-shaped relationship similar to the result in
Rodrik and Wacziarg, Table 1, Columns 2–4: the positive association between
democratization and growth is transitory and dies off after about ten years.
Columns 4–6 control for factors that could reasonably mediate a short-run association
between democratization and growth, and have been proposed in the literature:
investment, government consumption, trade and subsequent economic liberalization.34
The overall conclusion is easily summarized: conditional on this set of controls, we still
see an immediate, sizeable and signiﬁcant association between democratization and
growth. I interpret this as evidence that the growth effect of democracy is not mediated
33 To get a sense of the magnitude, consider the example of Spain, which democratized in 1976 with a
real per capita income of 8,606 (constant USD). In 2010, per capita income was 15,462 corresponding to
an average annual growth rate of 1.7 per cent. Had Spain not democratized, annual growth would
(assuming that the average ﬁts Spain) have been lower by 0.80 per cent. In 2010, Spain would then have
had an income of 11,822, not much higher than contemporary income in Trinidad.
34 Here, following the literature, a country is considered illiberal if (1) average tariffs exceed 40 per cent,
(2) non-tariff barriers cover more than 40 per cent of imports, (3) the country has a socialist economic
system, (4) the black market exchange rate premium exceeds 20 per cent and (5) most exports are
controlled by a state monopoly. The ﬁrst year in which none of these conditions apply is considered the
ﬁrst year of liberalization. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005, 1315 and Appendix C) report that
democratization increases the probability of economic liberalization by 32 per cent.
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through these channels. The coefﬁcients in Column 6 imply that after ten years, the
average democratizing country is richer by 11.9 per cent in real per capita GDP compared
to before democratic reform. Interestingly, Column 6 shows that adding these controls
attenuates the Phase 2 coefﬁcient. This is intuitive. First, it seems natural to assume that it
takes a few years after a major reform for investment rates and trade ﬂows to increase.
Secondly, Giavazzi and Tabellini demonstrate that the average time lag between
democratization and subsequent economic liberalization is four years. Both observations
are consistent with the attenuation found in the second phase of the democratic
transition. More surprisingly, Column 6 also shows that the Phase 1 coefﬁcient increases
substantially conditional on the set of economic controls. So if it is not political
emancipation in and of itself or the set of economic controls traditionally considered in
the literature, what is it about democratization that stimulates the economy within the
ﬁrst ﬁve or ten years?
I make the claim that international redistribution in the form of foreign aid to new
democracies shows up as growth in the short run in two steps. First, I redo Table 1 using
foreign aid as the dependent variable to illustrate how foreign aid and growth generally
move in tandem during democratizations. Secondly, I repeat Table 1 again, this time
controlling for inﬂows of foreign aid to see if the growth-accelerating effect of
democratization is robust to this channel. It is not.
TABLE 2 Democratization and Foreign Aid Receipts
Reduced-form associations Controlling for channels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democratization 1.22** 0.96** 1.11** 1.04**
(0.50) (0.42) (0.49) (0.49)
Democratization Phase 1 1.93** 1.70**
(0.78) (0.69)
Democratization Phase 2 1.29* 0.58
(0.72) (0.46)
Democratization Phase 3 0.25 0.50
(0.39) (0.44)
Pre-Democratization 0.57 0.53 0.59 0.61 0.72* 0.62
(0.35) (0.40) (0.36) (0.44) (0.42) (0.44)
Other regime change No No Yes No No Yes
Liberalization No No No Yes Yes Yes
Economic controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,386 4,171 4,368 3,496 3,265 3,496
Countries 123 123 122 117 115 117
R2 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.53
Note: The dependent variable is ODA in percent of GNI. All models contain country and year
ﬁxed effects, lagged income per capita, lagged aid, indicators for short regime interims and
time-interacted regional dummies for Africa, post-Communist countries, Latin America and
oil-exporting countries. Column 2 includes two lags of the dependent variable. Column 3
controls for autocratization and state failure. Columns 4-6 control for investment, trade,
government spending and economic liberalization. Column 5 contains a contemporaneous lag
and two lags of the difference of economic controls. Robust standard errors are clustered by
country in parentheses. *** p, 0.01, ** p, 0.05, * p, 0.1. Sources: Marshall and Jaggers
(2011), World Bank (2012), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005).
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DEMOCRATIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION
Figure 1 indicated that donor governments’ aid allocation rules are responsive to regime
changes. The average democratization was accompanied by an immediate spike in aid
inﬂows of about 6 per cent of GNI; young democracies are donor darlings. This conﬁrms
the notion that foreign aid ﬂows respond to donor interests and politics.35 Moreover,
while foreign aid targeted speciﬁcally at democracy-related programs remains relatively
modest, it is increasingly common to condition budget support (in the form of grants
or loans) on democratic performance.36 Table 2 conﬁrms the association between aid and
democratization.
Table 2 is structured the same way as Table 1. The ﬁrst three columns redo the core
speciﬁcations in the democratization-growth literature, but this time with aid inﬂows in
per cent of GNI as the dependent variable. The last three columns include the same
controls as in Table 1.
The table reveals a similarity in the way aid and growth respond to democratic reform:
aid, like growth, is substantively and signiﬁcantly associated with the event of becoming a
democracy. And aid, like growth, exhibits a hill-shaped relationship to democratic
reform. In both cases, the correlations are particularly strong and particularly signiﬁcant
in the early years of democratization, disappear after around ten years and are robust to
the inclusion of economic controls. In short, aid and growth move in tandem in the early
years of young democracies.
We proceed to examine if there is an independent association between democrati-
zation and growth once aid is controlled for. To do so, the analyses from Table 1 are
repeated, this time including the inﬂow of foreign aid in per cent of GNI as a control
variable.
In all six speciﬁcations, controlling for aid strongly attenuates the coefﬁcient on
democratization, and in all speciﬁcations the coefﬁcients turn insigniﬁcant. In all
speciﬁcations, foreign aid (lagged one period) is very signiﬁcantly associated with growth.
The coefﬁcient estimates for aid range from 0.08 to 0.14, which is slightly smaller than
existing studies. Most studies report coefﬁcients around 0.15.37 When democratic reform
is considered en bloc, as in Columns 1–2 and 4–5, the coefﬁcient on democratization is
literally cut in half. Recall that in Table 1, the ﬁrst two columns showed a signiﬁcant and
substantial association between democratization and growth of 0.80 and 0.71 per cent,
respectively. In the two ﬁrst columns in Table 3, which hold the exact same speciﬁcations
except that aid is included, the corresponding estimates are 0.41 and 0.35, respectively.
Columns 3 and 6 show that the estimated association is attenuated most strongly in the
early years of the transition. Thus conditional on aid, the estimated coefﬁcient on the ﬁrst
ﬁve years of democracy drops from 0.64 to 0.21 and 1.28 to 0.68 in Columns 3 and 6,
respectively. This is unsurprising. Given that the aid inﬂow was strongest in the early years
of democratization, we should expect to see the largest reduction of the democratization-
growth association in the same years. Overall, Table 3 shows that, conditional on aid, there
are few signs of a positive growth effect of democratization. The consistency of this
35 To take one example, Drury, Olson, and Van Belle (2005) showed that not only does US
development assistance respond to US strategic interests, but the same applies to US disaster assistance,
which is commonly seen as the least politicized component of US aid.
36 See, for example, Carothers 1999; Cornell 2012; Knack 2004; Wright and Winters 2010.
37 For example, Hansen and Tarp 2000; Werker, Ahmed, and Cohen 2009.
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conclusion across speciﬁcations and controls is remarkable, particularly given the sensitivity
of the democracy-growth association to the choice of controls.38
Figure 2 illustrates the article’s key result. The solid curve demonstrates that aid
increases around the time of democratization and tapers off after about ten years,
resulting in the hill-shaped association identiﬁed in Table 1. The dotted curve shows that
after controlling for aid, the hill disappears.
From Aid to Growth
The results in Table 3 explain the short-run association between democratization and
increased rates of economic growth; this association is channeled by the immediate and
substantial aid inﬂux. The table does not, however, fully complete the causal chain. After
all, ‘foreign aid is not produced inside a country’s borders, [and] should not show up in
GDP in and of itself’.39 Yet ‘if a reasonable fraction is spent inside the country, it should
eventually appear in the national accounts’.40 This is an aggregate demand effect. When
TABLE 3 Democratization, Aid and Growth
Reduced-form associations Controlling for channels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Democratization 0.41 0.35 0.34 0.43
(0.41) (0.33) (0.40) (0.38)
Democratization Phase 1 0.20 0.68
(0.55) (0.49)
Democratization Phase 2 0.60 0.59
(0.49) (0.46)
Democratization Phase 3 0.00 20.57
(0.49) (0.52)
Pre-Democratization 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.23 0.21 0.26
(0.60) (0.47) (0.60) (0.44) (0.38) (0.43)
Lag foreign aid 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.12***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Other regime change No No Yes No No Yes
Liberalization No No No Yes Yes Yes
Economic controls No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,402 4,185 4,384 3,508 3,275 3,508
Countries 124 123 123 118 115 118
R2 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.22 0.22 0.22
Note: The dependent variable is GDP per capita growth. All models contain country and year ﬁxed
effects, lagged income per capita, indicators for short regime interims and time-interacted regional
dummies for Africa, post-Communist countries, Latin America and oil-exporting countries. Column
2 includes two lags of the dependent variable. Column 3 controls for autocratization and state
failure. Columns 4-6 control for investment, trade, government spending and economic liberali-
zation. Column 5 contains a contemporaneous lag and two lags of the difference of economic
controls. Robust standard errors are clustered by country in parentheses. ***p,0.01, **p,0.05,
*p,0.1. Sources: Marshall and Jaggers (2011), World Bank (2012), Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005).
38 Cf. Krieckhaus 2004.
39 Werker, Ahmed, and Cohen 2009, 226.
40 Ibid.
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spent, the inﬂow of funds from another country will cause the aggregate demand curve to
shift outwards. If prices are less than inﬁnitely elastic, this leads to a transitory output
expansion in the short run. The fact that theoretically it must be a short-run effect is
consistent with the ﬁndings above. The growth that follows democratization is transitory
and decreases after about ten years.41
An aggregate demand effect is not only theoretically consistent with the ﬁndings, it is
also consistent with the few empirical studies that trace the impact of aid through the
national accounts. Werker et al. use variation in oil prices as a plausible source of
exogenous variation in aid donations from OPEC countries to Muslim countries to
examine how aid trickles through the economy. They ﬁnd a substantive and signiﬁcant
effect on household consumption expenditure across different speciﬁcations. While the
identiﬁcation strategy alleviates doubt about the internal validity of these results, one
might question the external validity (generalizability); their sample is a particular one.
However, Chatterjee et al. ﬁnd identical results (‘aid is associated with a strong positive
increase in household consumption’) using a broader sample and more conventional
instrumentation strategies.42
Therefore my argument is not that the institutional characteristics of democratization
somehow improve the effectiveness of aid, an argument related to that of Burnside and
2
1
0
–1
–2
–10 –5 0 5 10
Growth controlling for aid
Years to/from democratization
Growth
G
ro
wt
h
Fig. 2. How aid affects the democratization-growth nexus
Note: The ﬁgure shows the coefﬁcients on dummies for each of the years surrounding democratization.
The analysis includes country and year ﬁxed effects. The solid curve shows growth around the time of
democratization; the dashed curve shows growth after the effect of aid has been removed.
Sources: Marshall and Jaggers 2011, World Bank 2012.
41 The long-run association between aid and growth is notoriously difﬁcult to disentangle (see, for
example, Arndt, Jones, and Tarp 2010; and Rajan and Subramanian 2008 for two divergent conclusions
from identical data). However, the short-run association between aid and growth seems uncontroversial
in the literature (see, for example, the meta-regression evidence in Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2011;
Clemens et al. 2012; and Rajan and Subramanian 2008, 643).
42 Chatterjee, Guiliano, and Kaya 2012, 4–5. To fully describe the chain of causation, aid can affect
private consumption through three potential channels: the government cuts taxes in response to the aid
inﬂows, the aid is passed on as transfers or subsidies and/or the aid is distributed in the form of increased
wages (Chatterjee, Guiliano, and Kaya 2012; Werker, Ahmed, and Cohen 2009).
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Dollar, who found that aid is growth enhancing conditional on good institutions and
policies.43 I tested this by including an interaction between aid and democratization (or
aid and the three democratization phases) in estimations that were otherwise similar to
those in Table 3. In none of the models were the interaction terms close to statistical nor
substantive signiﬁcance (results are available on request).
At this point, the endogeneity of aid to growth must be addressed. Aid is not randomly
allocated over recipient countries, but can be given to fast-growing countries to
incentivize or reward performance.44 However, in the voluminous aid-growth literature,
political motivations for giving aid are sometimes used as a source of exogenous variation
in aid.45 Prima facie this logic bodes well for the results here, because the aid spike
following democratization is likely to be politically motivated – suggesting that it is not
given to reward countries that grow quickly in the ﬁrst place.
Lastly, consider some alternative interpretations of the results in Table 3. The interpre-
tation presented here is that aid is an intervening variable that mediates the association
between democratization and growth. An alternative interpretation could be that countries
democratize in expectation of aid inﬂows, such that aid explains both democratization and
growth (the association between these variables would then be spurious). While the results
showed that the pre-democratization indicator was rarely associated with aid (suggesting
that democratization does not occur in response to aid),46 I should emphasize that this
interpretation is not necessarily inconsistent with the overall claim made here. Namely, that
the temporary growth hike that follows democratization is caused by aid rather than
democratization itself. Another alternative interpretation could argue that a positive change
in income explains both democratization and aid inﬂows. Yet in none of the models
presented in Tables 1 and 3 was the pre-democratization indicator signiﬁcantly associated
with growth. This suggests that democratizations did not, in general, occur in response to
improved economic performance.47
HISTORICAL EVIDENCE AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
Since aid in large measure is a post-1960 phenomenon, the association between growth
and earlier waves of democratizations was not confounded by a simultaneous inﬂow of
aid to young democracies. This observation is used to probe the plausibility of the results.
If becoming a democracy in itself ignites a growth acceleration, we should expect pre-1960
democratizations to also be growth enhancing. If, on the other hand, the growth effect
43 Burnside and Dollar 2000. Dalgaard and Hansen 2001 and Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2004
found that these results were generally not robust.
44 Obviously, aid can also be given to slow-growing countries (to alleviate the consequences of poor
performance), but since the ﬁndings suggest a positive effect of aid on growth, I focus on the potentiality
of donors self-selecting into high-performing countries.
45 For example, Rajan and Subramanian 2008, 648.
46 Using both ﬁxed effects and system GMM, Csordas and Ludwig (2011, 237) present evidence against
the idea that foreign aid induces democratic transitions.
47 An anonymous referee suggested another alternative interpretation. The hill-shaped association
between democratization and growth identiﬁed in Table 1 is consistent with the ﬁnding in Barro (1996, 14)
that ‘middle level democracy is most favorable to growth’, because Phases 1 and 2 are middle-level
democracy (average polity score is higher than non-democratizing countries and lower than Phase 3
countries). Barro speculates that democracy beyond an intermediate level might impair growth because of
redistributive pressure. This might also be consistent with the argument presented here if foreign aid
allows the recipient government to redistribute without resorting to distortionary taxation.
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of democratization is confounded by the inﬂux of aid, we should not expect
democratizations before 1960 to be associated with increased rates of growth.48
Table 4 shows the coefﬁcients from analyses of the growth effects of democratizations
between 1820–1959. In Column 1, a single indicator variable takes the value 1 in all
years after a country’s score on polity2 turns strictly positive. Column 2 allows for time-
persistent growth rates. Column 3 shows the coefﬁcients from an analysis that distinguishes
between three phases. Column 4 is identical to Column 1, except that it includes a dummy
for the years 1949–51 for the countries that were Marshall Aid recipients.
The results in Columns 1–4 in Table 4 are consistent with the conclusion reached
earlier: prior to 1960, democratizations were not confounded by the inﬂux of aid and were
not associated with accelerated rates of economic growth. Similar to the coefﬁcients
in Table 3, here too the coefﬁcients are positive but insigniﬁcant. Interestingly, the size of
the coefﬁcients from the earlier democratizations resembles the size of coefﬁcients from
later waves of democratization once the effect of aid is controlled for. Thus becoming a
TABLE 4 Historical Evidence and Sensitivity Checks
Dependent variable is GDP per capita growth
Years 1820–1959
Alternative democracy index:
ACLP-indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No aid Aid No aid Aid No aid Aid
Democratization 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.74* 0.44 0.58* 0.34
(0.35) (0.36) (0.34) (0.41) (0.42) (0.35) (0.37)
Democratization Phase 1 0.19 1.15* 0.94
(0.42) (0.63) (0.62)
Democratization Phase 2 20.43 1.07* 0.66
(0.53) (0.57) (0.58)
Democratization Phase 3 0.04 20.55 20.98
(0.43) (0.62) (0.66)
Pre-Democratization 20.08 20.04 20.66 0.66 0.08 0.10
(0.61) (0.63) (0.44) (0.45) (0.59) (0.60)
Marshall aid dummy 1.87**
(0.82)
Lag ln NAT 0.85*** 0.38 0.79***
(0.26) (0.28) (0.26)
Other regime change No No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes
Liberalization No No No No No No No No No No
Economic controls No No No No No No No No No No
Observations 3,447 3,292 3,395 3,447 3,853 3,853 3,653 3,507 3,852 3,852
Countries 78 78 78 78 132 132 129 129 132 132
R2 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18
Note: All models contain country and year ﬁxed effects. Column 2 contains two lags of the
dependent variable. Column 3 controls for autocratization and state failure. Robust standard errors
clustered by country in parentheses. ***p,0.01, **p,0.05, *p,0.1. Sources: Cheibu,Gandhi and
Vreeland (2009); Marshall and Jaggers (2011); Roodman (2008); and the World Bank (2012).
48 Democratizations in the nineteenth century likely differ from contemporary democratization in other
respects than the absence of aid. These analyses do not therefore in any rigorous way constitute a test of
the argument. I examine historical democratization merely to see if the economics of these are consistent
with the argument.
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democracy has in the last ﬁve decades been associated with an average (but insigniﬁcant)
growth effect of about 0.41 after controlling for aid (cf. Table 3, Column 1). Controlling
for Marshall Aid years, the corresponding estimate for democratizations undertaken in
the period 1820–1959 is 0.47, which is remarkably consistent.
The remaining six columns replace the Polity IV democracy index with the dichotmous
ACLP indicator and replace the World Bank measure of aid with the log of the constant
dollar amount of aid lagged one period from David Roodman’s NAT dataset.49 With this
data, the columns show the three core speciﬁcations, once without controlling for aid
(Columns 5, 7 and 9) and once where aid is controlled for (Columns 6, 8 and 10). Using
the ACLP indicator, the democratization-growth association remains substantial and
signiﬁcant. Moreover, across model speciﬁcations, the coefﬁcient on democratization is
attenuated and loses signiﬁcance when aid is controlled for, which is consistent with the
overall conclusion of this study.
As a ﬁnal robustness check, controls for political conﬂict were included. A body of work
has shown that democratization may trigger both interstate and civil war.50 Since war affects
the economy and might also affect donors’ aid allocation, an association between demo-
cratization and war or political violence potentially confounds the estimates. To examine
this, I used the Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset and re-ran Tables 1 and 3,
controlling for political violence, civil war, the aftermath of civil war, interstate war and all of
the above.51 In all cases, the inclusion of these controls leaves the argument intact:
democratization is still positively associated with economic growth, and the association still
disappears when aid is controlled for (results are available in the online appendix).
CONCLUSION
From earlier inquiries into the regime-development nexus, we inherited the somewhat
paradoxical result that becoming a democracy is growth promoting but being one is not.
Since previous research has found a signiﬁcant association between democratization and
growth even conditional on such plausible channels as economic liberalization, investment
rates or trade ﬂows, it was unclear what characteristic of young democracies stimulated
growth and distinguished this set of countries from established democracies. The answer
proposed here was foreign aid: receiving aid distinguishes democratizing countries from
democratic countries and can also plausibly generate a transitory aggregate demand
expansion that stimulates growth. This result resolved the paradox, since neither democracy
nor democratization is in itself distinguished by higher rates of economic growth.
49 Democratization was operationalized using the ACLP indicator, as with Polity IV. It takes the value
1 in the year in which a country goes from autocracy to democracy. It stays at 1 if the country does not
revert back to autocracy. Phases 1–3 are also deﬁned as above. The speciﬁc coding rules (cf. note 21) and
the estimation approach are also unchanged.
50 See, for example, Cederman, Hug, and Krebs 2010; Mansﬁeld and Snyder 2002.
51 More speciﬁcally, I did the following: (1) Added controls for civil war and international war
(categorical variables running from 0–10) individually and separately, and experimented with different
lags to allow for a few years of stability before the inﬂux of aid began. (2) Coded a dummy variable to
directly capture the aftermath of civil war. This dummy is coded as 1 in the ﬁrst year in which the civil war
variable turns 0, given that it was 4 or more in the previous year (on the 0–10 categorical variable, 3 is
deﬁned as ‘serious political violence’ and 4 is deﬁned as ‘serious warfare’). (3) Coded a dummy variable to
capture political violence that does not qualify as either international war or civil war. This was deﬁned to
include all instances in the interval 1–3 on the international war variable or the civil war variable. None of
these variables, individually or together, change the results presented here.
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The results proved robust to a set of different empirical speciﬁcations, to alternative
democracy indices, to alternative measures of foreign aid, to a broad set of economic
controls and to controls for political conﬂict. The historical implication of the ﬁndings –
that prior to 1960 and foreign aid as we know it, democratization should not bring growth
– could also not be rejected.
The conclusion, that the economic effects of democratization cannot be understood
from domestic factors alone, complements the emerging consensus on the importance
of external factors and interstate linkages in explaining the onset of democratic regime
change. External factors are important to understanding both the causes and conse-
quences of democratization.
Methodologically, this study suggests caution when interpreting reduced-form associa-
tions between political institutions and economic outcomes. It is often unclear how a
certain political arrangement affects the economy, and mediating variables can rarely
be found. This leaves the ﬁeld vulnerable to treating spurious associations as causal.
One solution seems to be to push back and zoom in on the mediating variables where a
clear causal narrative can be provided as to why a certain political institution has led to
the observed consequences.
The results in this article also have implications for practitioners in the development
community. A large empirical literature has established the importance of institutions
for comparative economic development,52 and the democratization-growth literature
clearly reﬂects this institutionalist turn. The academic interest in institutions has been
mirrored in the community of aid organizations, as codiﬁed in the so-called Augmented
Washington Consensus,53 which brought institutional reform and good governance to the
forefront of the development agenda. This makes sense: if institutions are instrumental in
achieving growth and alleviating poverty, why not tie aid allocations to measures of
institutional performance?
The conclusions inform development policy by pointing to an interesting circularity:
foreign assistance is allocated to countries that undertake institutional reform or perform
well on institutional indices on the presumption that institutional reform will spur
economic growth. In the case of democratic institutional reform, however, it is not the
political reforms themselves that enhance growth – it is the inﬂow of foreign assistance.
Thus in the short run, there seems to be a confounding of the effect of what
development organizations preach (institutional reform) and the effect of the ‘reward’
(aid) given to countries that comply. While this has only been documented for the case of
democratic reform, it could plausibly also relate to other types of institutional reform.
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